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Abstract In a pervasive computing environment, the 
need to establish trust amongst distributed services has 
attracted increasing attentions from both the industry and 
academia. As a widely adopted solution to carry a 
principal’s identity and attributes of different 
organizations, the credential-based trust establishment 
has become popular over Internet. In this paper, we 
propose a hybrid negotiation tree based modeling 
approach, named HiTrust, to build cross-organizational 
trust relationship. The HiTrust is used to characterize the 
gradual interactions state during the trust establishment 
between the principals from different security 
organizations. Compared with the original disclosure tree 
model, the hybrid tree model in HiTrust can embed both 
policies and credential sets in a tree node, and is able to 
describe fine-grained security policy with attributes or 
negotiation context information. This property endows 
the HiTrust with the capability of describing complex 
trust establishment requirements, and makes it more 
efficient to search desired tree node. Furthermore, to 
enhance the usability and efficiency of negotiation 
service, we propose a session state maintenance 
mechanism based on a policy stack and an asynchronous 
trust chain propagation mechanism. We have 
implemented the HiTrust prototype system, and 
experimentally verified that the Hitrust is effective and 
scalable.  
Keywords 
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Trust Negotiation, Policy, Privacy. 
1.  Introduction 
Pervasive computing environments is a distributed 
and mobile space [1], and entities may be operating in 
an unknown context. In a pervasive computing 
environment, many entities (e.g., services) generally 
should collaborate to deliver some business services. 
However, in a dynamic cross-organizational 
collaboration environment, services involved in a 
business process are often provided by different 
organizations (as shown in Figure 1), and lack supports 
of common security mechanisms and centralized 
management middleware [2]. On such occasions, the 
participating services involved in a pervasive 
computing environment may collaborate dynamically 
to achieve business objectives at run time, and a 
participating service may have to collaborate with 
multiple participating services which it has no pre-
existing knowledge in prior.  
 
Figure 1  Cross-organizational collaboration of 
services in a pervasive computing environment 
However, compared with traditional distributed 
system, the Internet-based pervasive computing 
systems are loosely coupled and more dynamic, which 
bring more challenges to the trust establishment of 
collaboration. For example, when a mobile client 
accesses a service provided by another unfamiliar 
security organization, the trust must be established 
firstly. Therefore, the dynamic trust establishment 
problem between principals without pre-existing trust 
relationship becomes a fundamental and crucial 
problem for cross-organizational collaboration. 
Moreover, during the trust establishing process, a 
more important but difficult problem is how to preserve 
the privacy of participants’ credentials and policies. 
The traditional centralized authority mechanism is not 
suitable since it has several limitations. Firstly, it 
requires users to fully trust service providers. Secondly, 
there is no guiding mechanism about for which 
credentials should be submitted. These two limitations 
 make users always blindly disclose all their attribute 
credentials in order to acquire service authorization, 
which not only increases network traffic overhead, but 
also lack of the ability to protect users’ sensitive 
information. 
To address such issues, Winsborough et al. 
proposed an automated trust negotiation (ATN) [3,4] 
approach, which aims to gradually build trust 
relationship between strangers through the interactively 
disclosing of credentials and security policies . In ATN, 
the status of participants for service providers and 
requesters is equivalent, so both sides have the 
privileges to protect their disclosed information during 
trust establishment, and a negotiation model is used. 
Meanwhile, this mechanism can accurately guide users 
to disclose information to build trust relationship. In 
ATN, the representative model describing this process 
is Negotiation Tree Model, which is essentially a tree 
with credentials generated according to security 
policies of the principals on both sides. However there 
are some problems limitations as follows: 
First, during the process of trust negotiation, only 
the credential nodes are extracted to generate a 
credential tree from security policies, while the other 
information related to negotiation status such as policy 
structure and fine-grained constraints are lost. In 
contrast, the security policy (e.g., a policy depicted in 
XACML) for real applications usually contains two 
types of useful constraints. One is the static attributes 
constraint for qualified credentials; the other is the 
dynamic context constraint for a negotiation context. 
Particularly, the function of dynamic context constraint 
can ensure the negotiation success ratio and 
performance, but be rarely considered in existing 
negotiation models. For instance, in order to ensure the 
negotiation quality and resist possible DoS attack, 
dynamic context constraints are usually required to 
restrict the number of interactions, received credentials, 
length of credential chain and so on. In this paper, we 
introduce a hybrid tree model which depicts both 
policy structure and negotiation context constraints. 
Second, in a negotiation tree, a policy will be split 
into several credential nodes. There are three 
deficiencies: ①.The original structure of a policy may 
be destroyed; ②. The number of tree nodes will be 
increased; ③.The performance of tree searching and 
matching will be reduced. In particular, to decide 
whether a policy is satisfied, it must backtrack to its 
parent node to reconstruct the original policy according 
to the credentials relationships. Unlike it, HiTrust holds 
the policy as a whole node and searches it through 
policy index id or hash value, which will improve the 
efficiency of policy query and compliance verification. 
Third, some existing ATN approaches generally 
assume that the credentials can be found locally, 
without adequate considerations on how to construct a 
credential chain. So far, RT [5] is an effective approach 
to discover credential chain during trust negotiation. In 
our former study, we have found that the synchronous 
construction of credential chain is always time-
consuming and becomes a major bottleneck problem of 
negotiation service performance. 
To address the above issues, we proposed a hybrid 
tree based dynamic trust negotiation service named 
HiTrust. We have made the following contributions.  
 First, we designed a hybrid tree model 
composed of both security policy and credential 
set nodes to depict the status of negotiation 
process, and presented an efficient automated 
hybrid tree construction algorithm. 
 Second, we presented an adaptive trust 
negotiation strategy based on the hybrid tree 
model, where a tree searching and information 
disclosure algorithm is given. In this strategy, a 
policy-stack mechanism is employed to improve 
efficiency of policy query, and an asynchronous 
credential chain propagation mechanism is 
employed to enhance the usability of HiTrust 
service.  
 Last, we have successfully implemented the 
HiTrust prototype system in the CROWN Grid 
[21], and comprehensive experimental study 
shows our approach is scalable and efficient.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as 
follows. We discuss related work in Section 2. Section 
3 elaborates the concepts and algorithms of hybrid tree 
model. We introduce some key techniques related to 
the adaptive negotiation strategy in Section 4. The 
implementation experience of HiTrust is given in 
Section 5. Finally, we conclude the paper in Section 6. 
2. Related work 
In Internet-based pervasive computing 
environments, the security, privacy and trust of cross-
organizational resources sharing and collaboration have 
become an important research issue. At present, the 
protection of sensitive credentials based on access 
control policy and trust establishment through dynamic 
negotiation between principals have attracted many 
research efforts, such as TrustBuilder [6], PeerTrust 
[7], Trust-X [8], TTG [3], trust negotiation for MAS 
system [9] and trust negotiation formal model [4].  
Winsborough [14] firstly proposed the concept of 
trust negotiation, describing trust negotiation process as 
with a credential disclosed sequence. In this sequence, 
 two participated principals   credentials are 
interactively disclosed the credentials and policies by 
participants. Ting Yu et al. [15] proposed the 
Disclosure Tree model, in which all nodes belong to 
credential type except for the root node. All the 
children nodes of one node compose of a satisfying 
credential set solution to this node. If there are multiple 
satisfying credential sets, they must be represented as 
multiple trees. In [15], authors proved that the 
disclosure sequence model and disclosure tree model 
are equivalent. The shortcoming of this model is that 
the number of trees is changeable, and there is 
redundant information between different trees. Yu and 
Bertino et al. [8, 16, 17] use the negotiation tree to 
express the security policy of both principals, and it is 
de facto a credential tree. Yu et. al. [16] proposed an 
AND-OR Tree to get a credential disclosure sequence, 
and provided a negotiation strategy PRUNES to 
address the complexity problem induced by brute 
searching in the AND-OR tree. Bertino et al. [8] 
constructed an AND-OR negotiation tree based on X-
NTL policy language to control the credential 
disclosure. Trust-Serv [18] is a model-driven 
framework using a state machine model for credential 
disclosure. Similarly, Chen et al. [19], based on 
negotiation tree model, provided an optimized 
credential sequence searching regarding to different 
sensitive cost. In [20], a meta-policy based information 
protection mechanism is presented, which also 
classifies credential sensitive cost in different levels. 
Negotiation strategy is also a key component of 
trust negotiation approach, in which the rules for 
credentials and policies disclosure are defined to 
disclose credentials and policies. Winsborough et al. 
[14] also gave two kinds of negotiation strategies: 
eager strategy and parsimonious strategy. However, 
these strategies are used independently, and also have 
not concerned the credential chain construction issue.  
Compared with the disclosure tree model, the 
features of the hybrid tree model are as follows: ①. 
The security policy node is added in the tree, and has 
the ability to describe more complex negotiation 
constraints. ②. The credential set node is a minimum 
credential solution to a security policy, which reduces 
the number of tree nodes. ③. The tree nodes are of OR 
logical relation compared with AND/OR tree. 
Therefore, HiTrust is an extension to credential 
tree model, the hybrid tree consists of both policy node 
and credential set node. HiTrust improves the ability of 
policy expression, and the relation between credential 
set and policy becomes clearer, and HiTrust also 
simplifies the hybrid tree construction algorithm and 
negotiation strategy algorithm.  
Moreover, many recent research efforts for 
production system are conducted. In [12], authors 
argue that trust negotiation is ready for a trial 
deployment in a real-world application. Some recent 
work has been introduced. TrustBuilder2 framework is 
for experimenting with trust negotiation runtime 
systems, the CLOUSEAU compliance checker which 
can quickly determine whether a set of credentials 
complies with a particular policy, and the Traust 
approach lets legacy applications take advantage of 
trust negotiation. Dragoni, et al. proposed two major 
research problems [10, 11] on trust negotiation: real-
life and dependability problems. The first one concerns 
an adaptive negotiation strategy according to security 
risk; the second considers how to provide self-
protection and self-healing functions against malicious 
attacks. Currently, our approach has been used to 
secure the remote hot deployment service in CROWN 
testbed. 
3. HiTrust: A hybrid Tree Based Trust 
Negotiation Service 
3.1 Basic Concepts 
In HiTrust, we adopt an attribute-based 
authorization mechanism, and a principal can be a user, 
a system process and so on. An attribute credential is 
the carrier of principal’s attributes assertion including 
principal identity, attributes etc. signed by an Attribute 
Authorities. In an attribute credential, there are 
principal’s public key, attribute items, signature and 
validation information and so on. In HiTrust, we use 
symbol C with or without subscripts to denote a 
credential and symbol N with or without subscripts to 
denote a credential set.  
Generally speaking, an attribute credential is issued 
directly by an Attribute Authority. However 
Furthermore, some delegation and trust federation 
technologies are used to multiple organizations 
collaboration, a principal’s attribute may be represented 
by with a credential chain (e.g., a typical certificate 
chain), and we uses Cm→Cn→C to represent a 
credential issuing sequence. Thereby, a credential chain 
construction is a procedure that often is used to find 
some potential attribute assertions that a principal owns.  
Security policy is used to enforce access control on 
resources (including service resources, sensitive 
resources such as credentials), and specifies which 
credentials should be shown to prove principal’s 
attributes. Generally, the policy decision procedure 
takes attribute values and negotiation context 
information as input and returns a boolean value. In 
HiTrust, a security policy (access control policy) on 
resources or credentials is denoted by symbol P. In P, it 
 also includes some static attributes constraints and 
dynamic context constraints. We use P∝R to denote 
that a resource R is protected by a policy P, and P∝N 
to denote that a credential set N is protected by P.  
A credential often contains some sensitive 
attributes, such as age, address etc., so holders should 
make corresponding security policy to protect them. A 
security policy to protect a credential C is denoted by 
p1∨…∨pn∝C, where “∨” means these atomic policies 
are of logical disjunction (or) relation.  
When making the security policy, we usually 
normalize a security policy P into a CNF (conjunctive 
normal form) formula. If a policy P cannot be further 
normalized into a DNF (Disjunctive Normal Form) 
formula, we call it atomic security policy, and every 
atomic policy p takes the following form: 
p= (C1 ∧C2… ∧ Cm) ∧ (constrains on C1…Cm).  
Therefore, a security policy P has the following 
form P =p1∨ p2∨…∨pn. A credential often contains 
some sensitive attributes, such as age, address etc., so 
holders should make corresponding security policy to 
protect them. A security policy to protect a credential C 
is denoted by p1∨…∨pn∝C, where “∨” means these 
atomic policies are of logical disjunction (or) relation.  
As shown in Figure 2, a principal is issued two 
attribute credentials by two attribute authorities, and 
these credentials can satisfied the policy p. Sometimes, 
a principal’s attribute credentials are often stored in the 
attribute authority servers or other servers. 
 
Figure 2  Relation between attribute credential and the 
security policy 
According to this convention, the authorization 
decision can be made easily with a normalized security 
policy. For example, as for a security policy 
p=(C1 ∧C2)∧(C1.x=vip)∨C3, this definition mainly 
contains two parts: ①. Specifying what credentials 
should be shown, where a credential is referred by a 
DN, such as C1 ∧C2, C3；② . Providing attribute 
constraints expression on credentials, e.g., C1.x=vip 
which denotes an equality constraint on attribute x of 
C1. During a trust negotiation process, these security 
policies will be sent to the corresponding negotiator, 
and at the same time, some negotiation context 
constraints for this trust establishment session will also 
be sent, e.g., a constraint creds.count≤5 which means 
the maximum number of credentials allowed to be 
received. 
Definition 1 (Minimum Credential Set Solution 
of Policy): Let p be an atomic policy within a 
negotiation session, if there exists a non-empty 
credential set N={C1,C2,…,Cn}, taking attribute value 
in Ck and context information of negotiation session as 
an input and making security policy p always be true, 
we call N as a credential set solution of policy p, 
denoted by N→p. if ∀N1⊂N, N1 ≠∅ there never holds 
N1→p, then we call N as a minimum credential set 
solution of policy p, denoted by N⇒p.  
 
3.2 Hybrid Tree Model 
The disclosure tree model splits some policy 
information and thereby it is inefficient for compliance 
checking. Instead, HiTrust uses a hybrid tree model to 
represent the relations between security policies and 
credential sets in order to control information 
disclosure during trust establishment in a fine-grained 
manner. 
Definition 2 (Hybrid Tree): A hybrid tree related 
to the resource R holds the following properties: 
1. The root node represents the resource R； 
2. For a credential set node or root node R, if no 
sensitive credentials are in this set, there is no child 
node, otherwise its child nodes represent security 
policies protecting this credential set. 
3. For a policy node, each of its child nodes, if has, 
represents a minimum credential set satisfying this 
policy. 
R
 
Figure 3  A hybrid tree example 
As shown in Figure 3, a hybrid tree has three kinds 
of nodes and two kinds of edges (shown in Table 1). 
Thus the hybrid tree model can describe all the 
relations between credential sets and access control 
 policies in one tree, and the relationship nodes to one 
parent node are of “or” logic relation.  
Table 1 Policies of principal A and B 
name note 
Root Node It represents the requested resource (e.g., a business service), 
Credential Set 
Node 
It represents the minimum credential set 
solution of a security policy 
Policy Node It represents the security policy for resources 
Satisfied Edge It is a relation of N⇒p 
Protected Edge  It is a relation of P∝N 
 
In a hybrid tree, a leaf node may be a type of 
Credential Set Node or Policy Node. If it is a 
Credential Set Node, it means that there are no 
protected credentials in this Credential Set. If it is a 
Policy Node, it means that there are no credentials 
satisfying this security policy. As shown in Figure 3, 
node NA1 means CA1 can be disclosed freely, while pB1，
pB3 and pA3 are policy leaf nodes, and it means that there 
is no minimum credential set solution for these three 
atomic policies.  
Based on the requested resource in a session, the 
credentials (stored in a credBase set) and the security 
policies (stored in a policyBase set) of both negotiation 
participants, a hybrid tree labeled by root node can be 
built according the following algorithm (Algorithm 1).  
Algorithm1. The Hybrid Tree Building Algorithm 
Input：credsBase, policyBase, requested resource R 
Output：A Hybrid Tree labeled by root 
1. buildHybridTree(credsBase, policyBase, R) { 
2.   root = new PoliciesNode(R); //set the root node of the 
Hybrid Tree 
3.   nodeSet.add(root); 
4.   while(nodeSet ≠ ∅) { // process each node in a loop 
5.     n = nodeSet.next(); //get an element from the node 
set 
6.     if(n==R || n contains sensitive credentials) { 
7.       P=getPolicy(policyBase, node); // get protected 
security policy 
8.       for(∀p∈P){ // processing every atomic policy  
9.         n.addChild(p); //add p as a policy subnode 
10.         nodeSet.add(n); } } 
11.     else if (n is an atomic security policy ) { 
12.       N←getPolicySolu4on(credsBase, n);//get the 
minimum credential set solution of the policy n 
13.       n.addChild(N); // add N as a credential set 
subnode 
14.       nodeSet.add(n); } 
15.   } //end of while loop 
16. return root; } 
As shown in Table 2, principal A is the provider of 
resource R, and makes an access control policy as (1),  
principal B has credentials CB1, CB2 and CB3, and B has 
the satisfying relations (2)&(3), but no credentials 
satisfy pA3. There is sensitive information in credentials 
CB1 and CB2, so B makes two policies (4)&(5) to protect 
them. Principal A has a non-sensitive credential CA1 
satisfies pB2 as (6). Based on these relations, we can 
build a hybrid tree as Figure 3 using Algorithm 1. 
Table 2 Policies of principal A and B 
principal policies note 
A (1) pA1∨pA2∨pA3∝R security policy for resource 
B 
(2) NB1={CB1}⇒pA1 
(3) NB2={CB2, CB3}⇒pA2 satisfied credential sets 
(4) pB1∝CB1 
(5) pB2∨pB3∝CB2 
security policy for sensitive 
credential  
A (6) NA1={CA1}⇒pB2 satisfied credential sets 
 
Property 1: In a hybrid tree, let p be a policy node, 
it will at most has one child credential set node.  
Explanation: This property can be got through the 
steps of Algorithm 1. If the number of child credential 
set nodes connected to the parent policy node is larger 
than 1, then we get:  
|getPolicySolution(credsBase, p)|≥2. 
Without losing generality, we assume there exist 
two credential sets N1≠N2 s.t. N1⇒p, N2⇒p, it is an 
obvious contradiction with definition of Minimum 
Credential Set Solution of the policy. Therefore, a 
policy node in a hybrid tree will at most has one child 
credential set node. 
Theorem 1: Let PA, PB be the policies of both 
participants during the trust negotiation respectively, 
and then the time complexity of the hybrid tree building 
algorithm is polynomial with the length of policies. 
Proof: Here we define the length of a policy p as 
|p|, which is the number of atomic policies within a 
normalized p (in a CNF formula). For example, the 
length of p=C1 ∧C2 is |C1 ∧C2|=1. We use L to denote 
the maximum value max(len(pi)) in all policies. 
Considering the line 4-16 in the while loop of 
Algorithm 1, we can reach a conclusion that the 
maximum number of Policies Node is L=|PA|+|PB|. 
According to Property 1, the number of Credential Set 
Node at most is |ΣN|≤L, so the times of loop operation 
are less than 2L. 
For the internal loop, the number of atomic policy 
is no more than L, so the time complexity of this 
algorithm is 2L2, that is 2(|PA|+|PB|)2. Therefore, the 
time complexity of the hybrid tree building algorithm is 
polynomial with the length of polices.           □ 
 Theorem 2: In a hybrid tree, if node N is both a 
leaf node and a type of Crendetial Set Node, we can 
obtain a successful trust negotiation procedure (i.e., 
getting the authorization on resource R) which 
discloses credentials from leaf node N to the root node. 
Proof: On the path from the root node to a 
credential set leaf node, the resource (original service 
or credential set) and policy node appear alternatively 
and end with a non-sensitive credential set, so there are 
totally 2×n+1 (n is an integer) nodes. In accordance 
with the order from the leaf node to the root node, we 
arrange these nodes as a sequence: N0, p0, …, pn-1, Nn, R 
(0≤n), R is the resource firstly requested, N0 (i=0) 
represents a credential set node which can be disclosed, 
the other node Ni (1≤i≤n) represents a credential set 
containing sensitive credentials, whose security policy 
is node pi-1 (1≤i≤n). Obviously node Ni (1≤i≤n) is the 
minimum credential set solution of node pi-1 (1≤i≤n). 
When n=0, since N0 is a node can be disclosed 
freely and also a minimum credential set solution of R, 
security policy represented by N1 also can be satisfied 
by the other side. Thus it makes resources represented 
by N2×i (i=1) be disclosed. 
When n=k (0≤k<n), assuming a credential set 
represented by node Nk can be disclosed,  then it 
means security policy in node pk can be satisfied, thus 
making credential set represented by Nk+1 be disclosed. 
That means when n=k+1(0≤k<n), a credential set 
represented by Nk+1 can also be disclosed； 
By combining the above induction results, we can 
get a successful trust negotiation path to R through 
disclosing credentials on this path.        □ 
From the above proof process, we can see that, to 
obtain an access authorization on resource R, the 
credentials must be disclosed in order from a leaf node 
to the root node. Besides, it also shows that a special 
case of hybrid tree path is a credential disclosure 
sequence. If we delete all security policy nodes in the 
sequence of N0, p0,…, pn-1, Nn, R (0≤n), it becomes a 
pure credential disclosure sequence. Based on this 
theorem, we can see the hybrid tree in Figure 2 
contains four leaf nodes, but only the path taking NA1 as 
its leaf node can find a successful negotiation process, 
while paths taking pB1, pB3 and pA3 respectively as leaf 
nodes cannot be successful.  
Definition 3 (Trust Negotiation Process): For 
principal A and B, let their credential sets and policy 
sets be NA, PA and NB, PB respectively. Supposing 
principal A owns resource R, then a trust negotiation 
process for B to request R of A is defined as a message 
exchange sequence 〈M1, … , Mn 〉, which satisfies the 
following conditions:  
(1) M2k+1⊆NA ∪PA, M2k⊆NB ∪PB, k≥1; 
(2) If N⊆Mk, and the protected policy of N is p, then 
there is {ΣCi}→p, Ci∈M1 ∪…∪Mk-1, i<k.  
Condition 1 gives the interactive information 
exchanging process during trust negotiation, and both 
sides need to disclose necessary information to the 
other side so as to promote trust establishment between 
them. Condition 2 shows that if one side discloses a 
credential set protected by p, this policy p can be 
satisfied by former credentials disclosed by the other 
side. 
Proposition 2: During a trust negotiation process 
based on a hybrid tree, the number of policy nodes and 
credential set nodes is even, on the path that the trust 
construction establishment depends on.  
Explanation: This property can be got obviously 
from Theorem 1. Based on this property, we can 
determine whether trust can be established through 
calculating the height of a hybrid tree. This is an 
effective tree pruning condition. 
Compared with disclosure sequence and disclosure 
tree model, the hybrid tree model has the ability to 
express more realistic trust establishment scenarios, 
which is mainly reflected on the three aspects: ①. The 
hybrid tree introduces the access control policy node, 
which can express fine-grained security constraints. ②. 
A credential set node corresponds to a minimum 
satisfying credential set, and a policy node only has a 
credential set node, thus the tree model is simplified 
and redundant nodes are reduced. ③. The hybrid tree 
is merely an OR relation tree which makes us easier to 
searched or processed the hybrid tree than an complex 
AND/OR tree. 
4. Adaptive Trust Negotiation Strategy 
In HiTrust, we design an adaptive trust negotiation 
strategy to improve the performance of trust 
negotiation. This strategy mainly includes two key 
techniques: the policy index mechanism based on a 
policy stack, and the asynchronous trust chain 
propagation mechanism. 
4.1 Adaptive Trust Negotiation Strategy 
To construct a whole hybrid tree, it requires two 
negotiators to disclose their credentials and security 
policies interactively. Taking the scenario in Figure 3 
as an example, principal A firstly constructs a SubTree 
1 (shown in Figure 4), which indicates only if B 
satisfies one of atomic security policies pA1, pA2 or pA3, 
then it can access resource R. In order to prevent 
principal B from blindly disclosing information, 
principal A needs to disclose this policy. During the 
 negotiation process, a principal can disclose its 
information according to its negotiation strategy. 
Assuming A discloses three security policies pA1, 
pA2 and pA3 based on SubTree 1. When B receives them, 
B will construct SubTree 2 and SubTree 3 with their 
respective credential sets, then B discloses policies 
pB1,pB2 and pB3 to A at one time. A constructs SubTree 
4 and in which the credential set NA1 can be freely 
disclosed. Based on the Theorem 1, there exists a trust 
chain from NA1 to resource R from NA1. 
R
 
Figure 4  SubTrees constructed during trust negotiation 
During the negotiation process, if any side finds all 
the atomic policies cannot be satisfied, it will terminate 
the negotiation process and send a terminate signal 
enclosed in a META message so as to avoid 
unnecessary further interactions. All of the similar 
signals are stored in META message. Besides, if it is 
too strict to control the information disclosure, the 
rounds of negotiation interactions will be increased and 
extra trust establishment cost will be introduced. 
Therefore, the negotiation strategy should be adapted 
according to the security risk and network requirements. 
The aim of negotiaiton strategy is to reduce the 
times of interactions, and improve the efficiency with 
low risk. Based on the hybrid tree, the negotiation 
strategy can adaptively guide the information 
disclosure. If there are more than one solutions of 
minimum credential set, a negotiation strategy needs to 
determine which set can be disclosed with in a higher 
priority. The aim of this strategy is to reduce the times 
of interactions, and improve the efficiency with low 
risk. The procedure of negotiation strategy in HiTrust is 
shown in Algorithm 2. 
Algorithm 2.  Adaptive Negotiation Strategy Algorithm  
Input：Message Mrecv  received from negotiation side 
Output：Message Msend disclosed by the principal 
1. NegoStrategy(Mrecv, hybridTree){ 
2.   if (∃ P∈Mrecv){  
3.   for (every p∈P){ //processing every atomic security 
policy 
4.     N←getPolicySolu4on(N, p); } //N is a full credentials 
set of a principal  
5.   for (∀Ci∈N){ 
6.     if (∃pi s.t. ProtectedPol(Ci)=pi ) {  
7.       Ptmp=∧pi; }} //finding security policy for sensitive 
credentials, and combining every policy 
8.   Psend =Normalization(Ptmp);}//normalize it as a CNF 
formula 
9.   if (Psend == ∅){ 
10.     Msend.creds = N; } 
11.   else{ 
12.     Msend.pol = NegoCfg.preprocess(Psend); } // sending 
the policy, which can implement various negotiation 
modes 
13.   Update(hybridTree); //updating the state of hybrid tree 
14.   } 
15.   if ( ∃N∈Mrecv){ 
    P=getSatisfiedPolicy(N); 
16.     for (every p∈P ) { 
17.       if (p.parenetNode()==N){ 
18.         Msend.creds = ∪N ; }} 
19.     Update(hybridTree); // updating the state of Hybrid        
tree 
20.    } 
21.   if (Msend = φ || ∃METAmsg∈Mrecv) { 
22.     METAmsg = NegoCfg(METAmsg, Msend); //according to 
the meta information, continue or terminate the 
negotiation  
23.     Msend.metamsg = METAmsgsend; } 
24. } 
During the negotiation procedure, META 
information plays an important role. It mainly consists 
of two types of information: One is the negotiation 
state signal including negotiation continue, failure, 
success and so on. The other is associated meta-
information with disclosed credentials or policies. For 
instance, when a credential set is sent, the policy id and 
hash will also be attached in META. This will help the 
receiver quickly query the exact policy, and avoid 
traversing all the nodes in the hybrid tree, thereby 
improving the negotiation efficiency. In this algorithm, 
a principal can choose to disclose information based on 
previous policy configuration and context information. 
For example, when there are several security policies p 
with different sensitive levels for a credential set N, we 
can use a fine-grained negotiation strategy to choose an 
appropriate p. During the negotiation procedure, META 
information plays an important role. It mainly consists 
of two types of information: One is the negotiation 
state signal including negotiation continue, failure, 
success and so on. The other is associated meta-
information with disclosed credentials or policies. For 
instance, when a credential set is sent, the policy id and 
hash will also be attached in META. This will help the 
receiver quickly query the exact policy, and avoid 
traversing all the nodes in the hybrid tree, thereby 
improving the negotiation efficiency. 
 4.2 Policy Stack  
Trust negotiation is a stateful process for 
participants, and all the key session information is 
stored with the hybrid tree structure. Because one in a 
complete negotiation process, more than one security 
policies of sensitive resources may be disclosed 
according to Theorem 2, lastly disclosed security 
policy must be satisfied firstly by credentials. Thus we 
put all the policies nodes in a stack (parallel policy 
nodes are stored as a list mode). In HiTrust, we use 
Policy Disclosing Stack and Policy Receiving Stack 
respectively to store the security policies. As illustrated 
in Figure 5, the root node is the requested resource in a 
hybrid tree, the policy node in a protected edge is 
constructed by the policy in Policy Disclosing Stack, 
and the policy node in a satisfied edge is constructed by 
the policy in Policy Receiving Stack. 
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Figure 5  A policy stack related the hybrid tree 
4.3 Asynchronous Credential Propagation 
Mechanism 
Since the collaboration over the Internet generally 
spans multiple security organizations, trust relationship 
may be evolved with different requirements. We 
classify the credential into two types. One is the 
principal’s ending credential which is stored locally, 
and the other is delegation credential or federation 
credential among attribute authorities which is stored at 
the authority server. When constructing a trust chain, a 
principal needs to dynamically discover the delegation 
credentials or federation credentials from authority 
servers.  
 
Figure 6  Asynchronous credential propagation for trust 
chain 
However, during the trust negotiation, it is a time-
consuming process when a principal wants to discover 
a trust chain to prove its ultimate privilege. At the same 
time, the total time of trust chain construction is almost 
proportional to the length of trust chain. When a long 
trust chain is too long, the negotiation performance will 
be reduced and even unacceptable. In order to resolve 
this problem, we introduce an asynchronous credential 
propagation mechanism. When an authority issues a 
credential to another authority, it will propagate the 
credential to the next authority server. An example 
shown in Figure 6, there are three security domains, 
where AA1 and AA2 have collaboration relation (C1 
→C2), and if AA2 and AA3 also have potential 
collaboration relation (C2 →C3), the credential C1 →C2 
will be propagated from AA2 to AA3, so a user within 
AA3 domain can easily construct a trust chain C1→ 
C2→ C3. 
In HiTrust, an attribute authority is implemented 
as a Web service, and a timestamp is embedded into a 
SOAP packet to prevent the replay attack. In HiTrust, 
The credential propagation is an asynchronous process, 
which is executed by an independent single process to 
guarantee the efficiency. 
5. System Implementation Experience 
5.1 HiTrust Prototype  
We have implemented HiTrust approaches in 
CROWN middleware. CROWN is the brief name for 
China Research and Development environment Over 
Wide-area Network, and it aims to promote the utilization 
of valuable resources and cooperation of researchers 
nationwide and world-wide. CROWN service grid 
middleware is the kernel to build an application service 
grid. CROWN adopts an OGSA/WSRF compatible 
architecture, and considers the application requirements 
and the limitation of security architecture of 
OGSA/WSRF, more focus is put on the Grid resource 
management and dynamic management mechanism. 
CROWN NodeServer is implemented based on Globus 
Toolkit Service Container, and some security 
specifications such as WS-Trust, WS-Security and 
WS-SecureConversation are used for secure 
communication.  
The architecture of HiTrust Agent is shown as in 
Figure 7, and it includes five key modules. 
  
Figure 7  Architecture of HiTrust agent 
(1). Message Agent: It is responsible for the 
protocol message encapsulation and parsing 
during the negotiation procedure. It firstly query 
the message session id, then extracts the 
credentials, policies and meta-information 
enclosed in communication message, finally 
forwards the data to the corresponding modules. 
(2). Negotiation Session Manager: It is responsible 
for the negotiation strategy selection and 
negotiation state maintaining for multiple trust 
establishment sessions. For a negotiation 
session, the state is fully stored by the hybrid 
tree and policy stack. Different session uses 
different negotiation strategy according to its 
security risk or network condition. 
(3). Negotiation Strategy Controller: It implements 
the functions of algorithm 2, and controlling the 
disclosure of credentials and policies according 
to the negotiation strategy.  
(4). Credential/Policy Parser: It is responsible for 
the credential and policy management, and 
providing a caching mechanism for frequently 
visited credentials. In HiTrust, credential is of 
X.509 v3 or SAML format, and security policy 
is of XACML format. All the functions such as 
credential verification, constraints verification 
are done by the Parsing Engine. 
(5). Credential Chain Constructor: It is responsible 
for credentials retrieval and credential chain 
construction. During the negotiation, it not only 
verifies the validation of credential chains, but 
also constructs credential chains satisfied specific 
security policy. To reduce the burden of lots of 
credentials retrieval, an asynchronous credential 
propagation mechanism is employed in this 
module. 
 
  
 
Figure 8  Chain-based security policy configurable HiTrust 
The HiTrust service is implemented as a Web service 
in CROWN NodeServer. As illustrated in Figure 8, 
multiple procedures are involved in the trust 
negotiation. When a client principal requests a target 
service which is protected by trust negotiation service, 
it will firstly initialize a HiTrust Agent. Upon 
receiving the negotiation requests from client, the 
service provider will also create a HiTrust Agent. The 
state of negotiation will be stored in hybrid tree and 
policy stack respectively. Then, the two participants 
may disclose their credentials or policies for sensitive 
credentials according to the negotiation strategy. If the 
negotiation succeeds, HiTrust will return a success 
status, and the context will be updated accordingly. 
The requester can insert the session id into SOAP 
header and sign it before sending to the target service. 
The target service will verify the authenticity of 
session id through its HiTrustHandler, and allow the 
access if the verification succeeds.  
We also developed an Eclipse Plugin-based client, 
named ATNLauncher (shown in Figure 9), which 
provides a tool to manage credentials, access control 
policies and config files. In ATNLauncher, client 
command parameter string can be generated via a 
wizard, and the negotiation procedure between client 
and server is displayed on a special GUI view, and we 
can check detailed information by clicking the policy 
or credential icon in the view. Moreover, the SOAP 
messages during negotiation can also be monitored 
and logged. 
    
 Figure 9  Screenshots of ATNLauncher 
5.2 Experimental Evaluation 
We have conducted some experiments in 
CROWN test bed. CROWN middleware is deployed 
on a cluster node with Intel Xeon 2.8GHz CPU, 2G 
RAM, Linux operating systems and 100Mbps Internet 
connection. The client is an IBM T40 computer with 
Intel 1.6 GHz CPU, 1G RAM, Windows XP operating 
system. In order to ensure the accuracy of evaluation, 
there are no other programs running on the computers. 
Unless special statement, each experiment is executed 
five times and the average value is chosen. 
Compared with general authorization mechanism 
without consideration to privacy and other sensitive 
information protection, trust negotiation primarily 
brings extra cost on secure communication and 
multiple interactions, thereby we want to evaluate the 
processing capability of HiTrust services. The 
performance is mainly impacted by three factors: traffic 
overhead (security communication), concurrent 
requests and credential queries. We generate four 
simulation groups to study our approach. 
Experimental Group 1: In this simulation, the 
credential uses Base 64 encoding, the size of every 
credential file in pem format is about 1-2 KB, and 
every security policy rule is about 1-5 KB. Through 
varying the size of SOAP message, we measure the 
request response time respectively.  
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Figure 10  Efficiency of HiTrust secure communication 
Figure 10 shows the one round communication 
time against the size of SOAP packet from 3-500 KB. 
When no security mechanism is employed, the request 
response time is below 500 ms (Without Security curve); 
When a RSA-SHA1 security signature mechanism is 
employed, the time is only about 650 ms for 100 KB 
SOAP message (Signature curve); When a 3DES-CBC 
encryption and RSA-SHA1 signature mechanism is 
employed, the time is about 1100 ms for 100 KB 
SOAP message (Encryption+Signature curve). As we can 
see, the one-round communication time increases 
linearly with the increasing size of SOAP message, and 
the security mechanism will impact the response time. 
But in a common trust negotiation scenario, the extra 
communication overhead is small when the number of 
credential and atomic policy is small (e.g., even if 10 
credentials and 10 policies are sent, the total size of 
communication is no more than 100 KB). 
Experimental Group 2: We designed two 
scenarios, one is a traditional authorization scenario 
without privacy protection, and the other is a trust 
negotiation with a three-round interaction. The number 
of concurrent requesting clients is varied from 5 to 50, 
we measure the total time of requests with and without 
trust negotiation mechanism.  
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Figure 11  Execution time of concurrent requests 
The result is shown in Figure 11. We can see the 
total execution time is about 10s for 50 concurrent 
requests under the traditional authorization mechanism 
(Authz curve), and about 50 s under the trust negotiation 
mechanism (HiTrust curve). The result shows that the 
overall executing time almost increases linearly with 
the number of concurrent requests, and negotiation 
service performance is scalable.  
Experimental Group3: We Launch the service 
deployed on cluster node, and a requester invokes the 
negotiation service to measure the performance of 
HiTrust Agent. We select a typical example with three 
rounds interaction, which is also used in TrustBuilder. 
We measure the time of every negotiation decision for 
HiTrust and TrustBuilder. 
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Figure 12  The engine execution time of every 
negotiaiton round for HiTurst and TrustBuilder 
 Figure 12 shows the average negotiation response 
time following different rounds. The bar chart indicates 
that the engine execution time during every interaction 
round in this example. As a whole, the time is 
approximately 15-40 ms in HiTrust. In Addition, we 
designed a similar scenario with Example 1 for 
TrustBuilder, and get the results. As shown in Figure 
12, the response time of TrustBuilder is higher than 
HiTrust. This is because that TE, on which 
TrustBuilder based, uses a negotiation tree model 
which need dynamically search and visit all credential 
nodes. 
Experimental Group 4: We still use a trust 
negotiation scenario with a three-round interaction, 
and generating different examples by varying the 
length of credential chain from 2 to 6. We mainly 
compare the time of trust establishment under three 
trust chain constructing methods. The first is the 
asynchronous credential propagation, and all 
credentials have been collected into local credential 
repository. In the second method, one negotiation side 
needs to get credentials from the remote AA servers. In 
the third method, both negotiation sides need to get 
credentials form the remote AA servers.  
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Figure 13  HiTrust service with credential chain 
construction 
As shown in Figure 13, the average time of getting 
a credential from an AA server is about 100-200 ms. 
For instance, when there are four credentials in a 
credential chain, the trust establishment time is about 
770ms, 1100 ms and 1300 ms for three different 
examples respectively. We can see that dynamic trust 
chain construction overhead has a great impact on trust 
negotiation performance. Therefore, the asynchronous 
credential propagation mechanism is very efficient to a 
realistic application.  
6. Conclusions and future work 
With the widely adoption of pervasive computing 
environments over the Internet, trust establishment for 
mobile services sharing and collaboration has become 
an important issue. 
We proposed a hybrid tree based dynamic cross-
organizational trust establishment service. The hybrid 
tree contains both policy node and credential set node, 
and it enables fine-grained security policy constraints 
for attributes and negotiation context, thereby it not 
only enhances the capability of trust establishment, but 
also simplifies tree search algorithm. Furthermore, we 
presented an adaptive trust negotiation strategy based 
on the hybrid tree, where a policy-stack based 
mechanism is employed to improve efficiency of 
policy query, and an asynchronous trust chain 
propagation mechanism is used to enhance the usability 
of HiTrust service. 
At present, we are also constructing a cloud 
computing environment iVIC 1 , which is a network 
software operating environment to provide the elastic, 
scalable, and transparent resource management 
mechanism. It leverages virtual machine (VM) or virtual 
network to launch network software, and delivers desired 
software on-demand through presentation streaming mode 
(based on VNC) to PC or mobile phone. Currently, iVIC 
has been used as a virtual lab infrastructure for our 
campus courses experiment. We are also trying to 
integrate the negotiation strategy to evaluate the risk of 
iVIC computing environment. In addition, trust 
establishment is also a key technology for data and 
application migration among multiple Clouds or 
Virtual Network. We will integrate our approach into 
iVIC to provide a transparent trust enabled 
collaboration infrastructure for mobile users.  
References 
[1] Hansmann, Uwe (2003). Pervasive Computing: The 
Mobile World. Springer. ISBN 3540002189, 2003. 
[2] Ali Ahmed and Ning Zhang, “Towards the Realisation of 
Context-Risk-Aware Access Control in Pervasive 
Computing”, the Telecommunication Systems journal, 
Springer US, DOI: 10.1007/s11235-009-9240-3, 
SpringerLink Date: December 30, 2009.  
[3] W. H. Winsborough and N. Li, "Towards Practical 
Automated Trust Negotiation," presented at Proceedings of 
the 3rd International Workshop on Policies for Distributed 
Systems and Networks (POLICY'02) Monterey, CA,USA, 
2002. 
[4] Zou, D., Park, J. H., Yang, L. T., Liao, Z., and Kim, T. 
2008. A Formal Framework for Expressing Trust 
Negotiation in the Ubiquitous Computing Environment. In 
Proceedings of the 5th international Conference on 
Ubiquitous intelligence and Computing (Oslo, Norway, 
June 23 - 25, 2008). Lecture Notes In Computer Science, 
vol. 5061. Springer-Verlag, Berlin, Heidelberg, 35-45, 
2008. 
                                                           
1
 http://portal.ivic.org.cn  
 
 [5] N. Li, W. H. Winsborough, and J. C. Mitchell, "Distributed 
credential chain discovery in trust management," Journal 
of Computer Security, vol. 11, pp. 35-86, 2003. 
[6] M. Winslett, T. Yu, K. E. Seamons, A. Hess, J. Jacobson, 
R. Jarvis, B. Smith, and L. Yu, "The TrustBuilder 
Architecture for Trust Negotiation," IEEE Internet 
Computing, vol. 6(6), pp. 30-37, 2002. 
[7] I. Constandache, D. Olmedilla, W. Nejdl, and " Policy 
based dynamic negotiation for grid services authorization," 
presented at Semantic Web Policy Workshop in 
conjunction with 4th International Semantic Web 
Conference, Galway, Ireland, 2005. 
[8] E. Bertino, E. Ferrari, and A. C. Squicciarini, "Trust-X:A 
peer to peer Framework for Trust Negotiations,".IEEE 
Trans on Knowledge and Data Engineeing, vol. 16, pp. 
827-841, 2004. 
[9] H. Yamaki, M. Fujii, and K. Nakatsuka, "A Dynamic 
Programming Approach to Automated Trust Negotiation 
for Multiagent Systems," presented at 1st International 
Workshop on Rational, Robust, and Secure Negotiations in 
Multi-Agent Systems (RRS2005), 2005. 
 
[10] N. Dragoni, F. Massacci, and A. Saidane, "A self-
protecting and self-healing framework for negotiating 
services and trust in autonomic communication systems," 
Comput. Netw., vol. 53, pp. 1628-1648, 2009. 
[11] N. Dragoni and A. Saidane, "A Framework for Dependable 
Trust Negotiation in Open Environments," presented at 
Fifth IEEE Workshop on Engineering of Autonomic and 
Autonomous Systems, Belfast, 2008. 
[12] M. Winslett, J. L. Adam, and J. P. Kenneth, "Trust 
negotiation: authorization for virtual organizations," in 
Proceedings of the 5th Annual Workshop on Cyber 
Security and Information Intelligence Research: Cyber 
Security and Information Intelligence Challenges and 
Strategies. Oak Ridge, Tennessee: ACM, 2009. 
[13] J. L. Adam and W. Marianne, "Towards an efficient and 
language-agnostic compliance checker for trust negotiation 
systems," in Proceedings of the 2008 ACM symposium on 
Information, computer and communications security. 
Tokyo, Japan: ACM, 2008. 
[14] W. H. Winsborough, K. E. Seamons, and V. E. Jones, 
"Automated Trust Negotiation," presented at In DARPA 
Information Survivability Conference and Exposition, 
2000. 
[15] T. Y. M. Winslett and K. Seamons, "Supporting structured 
credentials and sensitive policies through interoperable 
strategies for automated trust negotiation," ACM 
Transactions on Information and System Security, vol. 6, 
pp. 1-42, 2003. 
[16] T. Yu and X. M. M. Winslett, "PRUNES: An Efficient and 
Complete Strategy for Automated Trust Negotiation over 
the Internet," presented at Conference on Computer and 
Communications Security(CCS00), Athens, Greece, 2000. 
[17] T. Yu and M. Winslett, "A Unified Scheme for Resource 
Protection in Automated Trust Negotiation," presented at 
IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, Berkeley, 
California, 2003. 
[18] H. Skogsrud, B. Benatallah, and F. Casati, "Trust-Serv: 
Model-Driven Lifecycle Management of Trust Negotiation 
Policies for Web Services," presented at Proceeding of  
13th World Wide Web Conference(WWW2004), New 
York, NY, USA, 2004. 
[19] W. Chen, L. Clarke, J. Kurose, and D. Towsley, 
"Optimizing Cost-sensitive Trust-negotiation Protocols " 
presented at Proceedings of the 24th Conference of the 
IEEE Communications Society (Infocom 2005), , Miami, 
FL, 2005. 
[20] P. Bonatti and D. Olmedilla, "Driving and Monitoring 
Provisional Trust Negotiation with Metapolicies," 
presented at Sixth IEEE International Workshop on 
Policies for Distributed Systems and Networks 
(POLICY'05)  Stockholm, Sweden, 2005. 
[21] J. Huai, C. Hu, J. Li, et al., "CROWN: A service grid 
middleware with trust management mechanism," 
Science in China Series F: Information Sciences, 
vol. 49, pp. 731-758, 2007. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Jianxin Li is an associate 
professor in the School of Computer 
Science and Engineering, Beihang 
University, Beijing, China. He 
received the Ph.D. degree in Jan. 
2007. He has authored over 30 
papers in IEEE T. on Industry 
Electronic, Information Sciences, 
SRDS, HASE and eScience etc. His 
research interests include trust management, 
information security and distributed system. 
 
 
Bo Li received his Bachelor and 
Master degrees from Dalian 
University of Technology, China. 
Now he is a Ph.D. student at the 
Department of Computer 
Science, Beihang University, 
China. His research interests 
include a broad range of topics 
related to computer security including virtualization 
security, operating system security, and trusted 
computing. 
Dr Lu Liu is Senior Lecturer in 
School of Computing and 
Mathematics, University of Derby 
(UK). Before joining University of 
Derby, he was Lecturer in School of 
Engineering and Information 
Sciences at Middlesex University 
(UK). Prior to his academic career, 
he was Research Fellow in the 
School of Computing at the University of Leeds (UK), 
working on NECTISE Project which was an UK 
EPSRC/BAE Systems funded research project 
involving ten UK Universities and CoLaB Project 
which was funded by UK EPSRC and China 863 
Program. He received a Ph.D degree (funded by UK 
DIF DTC) from the University of Surrey (UK) and 
M.Sc. degree from Brunel University (UK). His 
research interests are in areas of service-oriented 
computing, software engineering, Grid computing and 
peer-to-peer computing. Dr Liu has over 50 scientific 
publications in reputable journals, academic books and 
international conferences. He won the Best Paper 
Award at the Realising Network Enabled Capability 
Conference in 2008. He is member of IEEE. 
 
 
Da-Zhi Sun received the M.E. 
degree in control science and 
engineering from Nanchang 
University, Jiangxi, in 2002, and the 
Ph.D. degree in computer science and technology from 
Shanghai Jiao Tong University, Shanghai, China, in 
2006.He is currently a lecturer at the School of 
Computer Science and Technology, Tianjin University, 
Tianjin, China. His current research interests include 
applied number theory, applied cryptography, and 
information security. 
Xudong Liu is a professor and dean of the School 
of Computer Science and Engineering, Beihang 
University, Beijing, China. Has 
have leaded several China 863 key 
projects and e-government projects. 
He has published more over 30 
papers, more than 10 patents. His 
research interests include software 
middleware technology, software 
development methods and tools, 
large-scale information technology 
projects and application of research and teaching.   
 15 
 
